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Abstract
This paper proposes a mechanism for the regulation of firms in the context of asym-
metric information with the aim to induce firms to report its private information truth-
fully and to save information rents. Baron and Myerson (1982) have considered this
problem and derived an optimal policy for regulating a monopolist with unknown costs.
They show that it was possible to create a regulatory mechanism that induced the firm
to report its private information truthfully. To secure this, a part of the mechanism is
to pay the firm a subsidy. This article presents a regulatory mechanism which explores
competition in the context of an industry characterized by increasing returns to scale.
In contrast to the model in this article, the Baron and Myerson model doesn’t consider
increasing returns to scale. In equilibrium each firm chooses to report truthfully without
receiving any subsidy. However, the use of competition gives rise to an efficiency lost.
1. Introduction
One of the most common themes in the theory of regulation is to find method for which
asymmetric information between a regulator and firms can be reduced and informational
rents can be saved. Starting with Loeb and Magat (1979), regulation has been modelled as
a principal-agent problem and further to be analysed in connection to the incentive compat-
ibility where conditions are placed that induce one to reveal his information to another (see
for example Myerson (1979)). Baron and Myerson (1982) considers the problem of asym-
metric information and presents a mechanism that induce a firm to report its cost truthfully.
A part of this mechanism is to pay the firm a subsidy which gives the firm no incentive to
misreport its costs. Since Baron and Myerson, asymmetric information models have been
studied in a variety of contexts. For example, work by Lewis and Sappington (1988), Laffont
and Tirole (1993) and Laffont and Martimort (2002) have added greatly to the literature and
our understanding of incentive regulation. In spite of the amount of literature, there have
only been a few papers dealing with more than one firm. Auriol and Laffont (1992) examine
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a duopoly when marginal costs are private information and fixed costs are common knowl-
edge. Their model follows the ideas of Baron and Myerson, but in a more static structure.
The Auriol-Laffont mechanism makes use of yardstick competition to regulate the market.
One conclusion is that asymmetric information has informational costs, but the rents are
lowered by the use of yardstick competition. Others have studied mechanism design in mar-
kets of more than one firm (see Dalen (1988), Tangerås (2009), among others), but again,
asymmetric information has informational rents and rents the regulator has to accept.
This paper analyse how the existence of potential competition can be used to save infor-
mational rents. By allowing competition in industries such as electricity, gas or transport,
we know that the introduction of yardstick competition may reduce rents, but can we re-
move all informational rents? This paper present a regulatory mechanism which secure
truthfully costs reports and remove informational rents, or in contrast to the Baron and My-
erson mechanism without paying any subsidies. As a drawback, the use of competition give
rises to an efficiency lost. In contrast to other models, among the models mentions here,
our mechanism is analysed is the framework of increasing returns to scale technology, and
besides yardstick competition, take use of a rate of returns on capital which is used to secure
competition.
While there is a extensive literature on how to regulate an industry, mechanism design
in the framework of oligopoly and increasing returns to scale technology in a would of
asymmetric information is given less attention. A paper close to this paper is by Sengupta
and Tauman (2004). They consider a oligopolistic market with increasing returns to scale,
but derive a inventive mechanism based on a bidding contract. The paper use competition
and subsidies in such a way that the regulator offers a contract to exclusively subsidize one
firm. The paper shows that the winning firm produce and all other firms exit the market.
In contrast to our framework, their assume full information about the market and the cost
structure.
The use of increasing returns to scale technology allows for some real live situations.
There are markets for firms in industries such as electricity, gas, telecommunications, water
possessing increasing returns to scale technology and this is needed in the literature of reg-
ulation. In connection with this, there are questions in debates on how to make use of the
potential competition in industries characterized by monopoly or natural monopolies.
Expanding the literature on regulation in relation to increasing returns to scale and real
live situations, this paper, at first, provides a mechanism which induces truthfully cost re-
ports without paying subsidies, second, gives an evaluation of the existing regulation in the
market for supply obligation gas, and at last, highlight that these special advantages can be
used in every areas where firms possessing increasing returns to scale technology. Three
points which haven’t been shown in the existing literature.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the structure of the model and
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the Baron and Myerson model. In section 3 we set up the basic model for the regulated
competition. This model is then extended in the sections 4 and 5 to a mechanism in order
to make it comparable with the model of Section 2 and state our main results. Section 6
contains some concluding comments and indicates fields of further research.
2. The model
We consider an industry with a technology admitting increasing returns to scale. The number
of firms operating in this industry may be one or several, but all have access to the same
technology, defined by cost function of the form C(q, θ), where q is the level of output and θ
is a parameter describing the efficiency level of the firm. In much of what follows, we shall
assume that C(q, θ) is (multiplicatively) separable in its two arguments, i.e. it takes the form
C(q, θ) = θC¯(q), (1)
where C¯ is a fixed cost function. We shall assume that for fixed θ, the function C(·, θ)
is concave, so that there is nondecreasing and possibly increasing returns to scale. The
parameter θ takes values in a set Θ and is assumed to be observable only by the firm.
The demand side in our model is formalized by an inverse demand function p(q), deter-
mining the price p(q) at which the output q can be absorbed in the market. For considerations
of welfare, we shall use the function V(q) defined by
V(q) =
∫ ∞
0
p(q) dq, (2)
using which we may define the consumer surplus at the level of consumption q by
S C(p) = V(q) − p(q)q. (3)
We shall be interested in comparing two very different ways of regulating this market,
namely one where only a single firm is operating, being a regulated monopoly, and (2) the
case where there are two firms in the market, operating under regulated competition. Of the
two cases, the first one has been very thoroughly investigated, at least for the case of non-
increasing returns to scale, and consequently, our treatment of this case will be restricted to
checking that the methods of regulating a monopoly described in Baron and Myerson (1982)
can be adapted to the present situation. This will be the topic of the remaining part of this
section. Then we turn to case (2) of regulated competition in the following section.
We consider a mechanism where the firm announces its type θ, and the regulator chooses
a triple (r, q, s) of functions of θ, where
(i) r(θ is the probability that the firm is allowed to carry out business, taking values in the
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interval [0, 1],
(ii) q(θ) is the quantity which the firm is permitted to market, and
(iii) s(θ) is a subsidy paid to the firm.
We assume that the regulator has an objective of the form∫
Θ
[
(V(q(θ)) − p(q(θ))q(θ))r(θ) − s(θ)] dF(θ) + α∫
Θ
pi(θ) dF(θ), (4)
where pi(θ) is the profit of the firm,
pi(θ) =
[
p(q(θ))q(θ) −C(q(θ), θ)] r(θ) + s(θ).
In addition, the firm should satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint
pi(θ, θˆ) =
[
p(q(θˆ))q(θˆ) −C(q(θˆ), θ)
]
r(θˆ) + s(θˆ) ≤ pi(θ)
for all θ, θˆ ∈ Θ, saying that θ is the best possible message for the firm given that the true type
is θ.
In the following, we assume that Θ is an interval [θ0, θ1] in R, and that C(q, θ) is C1
with bounded first derivative C′2(q, ·). Then, by the envelope theorem of Milgrom and Segal
(2002), we can write
pi(θ) = pi(θ1) +
∫ θ1
θ
r(t)C′2(q(t), t) dt, (4)
and the regulation policy (r, q, s) is feasible (in the sense that the firm has non-negative
profits and is as well off with truth-telling as with any other reporting) if for all θ ∈ Θ,
pi(θ) ≥ 0,
r(θ)C′2(q(θ), θ) ≥ r(θˆ)C′2(q(θˆ), θˆ), all θˆ ≥ θ.
To proceed, we assume that the cost function is multiplicatively separable,
C(q, θ) = θCˆ(q)
for all q and θ, so that in particular is independent of θ.
C′2(q, θ) = C¯(q)
We then have that the value of the objective function at the regulatory policy (r, q, s) can be
written as ∫ θ1
θ0
[
V(q(θ)) − C¯(q(θ))zα(θ)
]
r(θ) f (θ)dθ − (1 − α)pi(θ1), (5)
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where
zα(θ) = θ + (1 − α)F(θ)f (θ) . (6)
Indeed, using the expression for pi(θ) and changing the order of integration, we get that∫ θ1
θ0
pi(θ) f (θ) =
∫ θ1
θ0
[
pi(θ1) +
∫ θ1
θ
r(t)C¯(q(t)) dt
]
f (θ)dθ
= pi(θ1) +
∫ θ1
θ0
∫ t
θ0
r(t)C¯(q(t)) f (θ)dθdt
= pi(θ1) +
∫ θ1
θ0
r(t)C¯(q(t))F(t) dt.
Next, we notice that
p(q(θ))q(θ)r(θ) + s(θ) = pi(θ) + C(q(θ), θ)r(θ), (7)
so that ∫ θ1
θ0
[
(V(q(θ)) − p(q(θ))q(θ)) r(θ) − s(θ) + αpi(θ)] dF(θ)
=
∫ θ1
θ0
[
(V(q(θ)) − C¯(q(θ))θ)r(θ) − (1 − α)pi(θ)
]
f (θ) d(θ)
from which we get (5) after inserting (7).
To find the regulatory policy which maximizes (4) we make the simplifying assumption
that the quantity
F(θ)
f (θ)
is increasing in θ, so that also zα(θ) is increasing in θ. We then have
that q(θ) must be maximizing
V(q) − zα(θ)C¯(q)
for each θ, so that q(θ) is the quantity which arises from marginal cost pricing given the
cost function zα(θ)C¯(q). The function r(θ) should be chosen such that r(θ) = 1 when the
the welfare component V(q(θ)) − zα(θ)C¯(q(θ)) is non-negative and 0 otherwise, since the
objective function is linear in r. Finally, the subsidy function s(θ), which enters the objective
function only through pi(θ1), can be defined as the smallest one which does not violate the
incentive compatibility constraints, implying that pi(θ1) = 0. Using (6) and inserting the
expression for pi(θ), we get
s(θ) = −p(q(θ))q(θ) + C(q(θ), θ)r(θ) + pi(θ)
= [C¯(q(θ))θ − p(q(θ))q(θ)]r(θ) +
∫ θ1
θ
r(t)C¯(q(t)) d(t).
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Summing up the preceding argumentation, we have the following.
Proposition 1. Assume that C(q, θ) is multiplicatively separable, and that the ratio F(x)/ f (x)
is non-decreasing in θ. Then the optimal regulary policy (r(·), q(·), s(·)) is given by
(i) q(θ) = Argmaxq
[
V(q) − zαC¯(q)
]
,
(ii) r(θ) = sgn
[
V(q(θ)) − zα(θ)C¯(q(θ))
]
,
(iii) s(θ) = C¯(q(θ))θ − p(q(θ))q(θ)]r(θ) + ∫ θ1
θ
r(t)C¯(q(t)) d(t),
where zα(θ) is given by (6).
3. Regulated duopoly under perfect information
In this section, we consider a method of regulating the market which differs markedly from
the case treated above, since in this case the regulator allows for more than one firm operat-
ing. In the context of increasing returns to scale, this means that an efficiency loss may have
to be accepted; on the other hand, the absence of subsidies will in some sitautions make the
duopoly solution preferable from a social welfare point of view.
In contrast with what was done in the previous section, we shall study a particular
mechanism rather than searching for an optimal one. We shall assume that the regulatory
mechanism uses a benchmarking approach based on the realized productions and associated
costs. Though most regulations in practice are based on average cost, we shall make use
of marginal cost, suitably defined. The argument for not using average cost is rather strong
given our general background of increasing returns to scale, where marginal rather than av-
erage cost plays a role in guiding towards an welfare optimum. ome being smallest of the
profits obtained in the market and the permissible profits.
We keep the setup and notation from the previous section. However, we shall proceed in
several steps, beginning with the case where both firms have the same type, which then may
be considered as a property of the underlying technology rather than the firm, and moreover,
this type is known to the regulator. In this case, there is no problem of revelation of type,
the only problem remaining for the regulator is to make sure that there the duoply is turned
into a monopoly, which would be the case in an unregulated market.
Let θ ∈ Θ be this common type, and define the associated cost function Cˆ(q) = C(q, θ),
which depends only on produced quantity, also assumed to be observable.
We assume throughout this section that the increasing returns considered are important
but not sufficiently important to exclude that an unrestricted Cournot equilibrium with posi-
tive profits. Clearly, this equilibrium is far from being a welfare optimum, and the purpose
of regulation is to approach this optimum as far as possible under the given institutional
constraints.
Assumption. There is a volume of production q such that p(2q)q − Cˆ(q) > 0.
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Let qi for i = 1, 2 be the choices of the two firms. A benchmark selector is a continuous
map q∗ : R2+ → R+ as a map which to each pair (q1, q2) of realized productions gives a
production level in the interval [min{q1, q2},max{q1, q2}]; we shall assume it chosen such
that
Cˆ′(q∗(q1, q2)) =
Cˆ(max{q1, q2}) − Cˆ(min{q1, q2})
max{q1, q2} −min{q1, q2} (8)
for q1 , q2, q∗(q, q) = q, so that the marginal cost at the point q∗(q1, q2) in the case where
q1 > q2 equals the slope of the chord from the point (q2, Cˆ(q2)) to the point (q1, Cˆ(q1). The
benchmark selector q∗(q1, q2) then satisfies the condition[
Cˆ(q∗(q1, q2)) − Cˆ′(q∗(q1, q2)) (q∗(q1, q2) − q2)
]
−C(q2)
=
[
Cˆ(q∗(q1, q2)) + Cˆ′(q∗(q1, q2)) (q1 − q∗(q1, q2))
]
−C(q1)
for q1 ≥ q2, stating that if firms are remunerated according to the linear approximation of
the cost function at the benchmark, then the difference between the regulated income and
the cost is the same for each firm.
Given the benchmark selector, and the benchmark (marginal) cost
c∗(q1, q2) = Cˆ′(q∗(q1, q2)),
we may define the the permissible revenue for any firm at the production level qi by
r(qi; qi, q j) = I(qi, q2) + c∗(qi, q j)qi, (9)
where I is an allowance for fixed costs, defined in the case where q1 ≥ q2 by
I(q1, q2) =
max{a | a + c
∗(q, q2)q > Cˆ(q), q ∈ R+} if q1 ≤ Argmaxq p(q + q2)q,
Cˆ(q1) − c∗(q1, q2)q1 otherwise;
(10)
for the case where q2 > q1 we define I(q1, q2) similarly with the roles of q1 and q2 inter-
changed. The profit of firm i producing qi can then be found as
piri (q1, q2) = min
{
r(qi, ; q1, q2) − Cˆ(qi), p(q1 + q2)qi − Cˆ(qi)
}
. (11)
Thus, the regulatory mechanism works through c∗, the marginal cost at the benchmark pro-
duction level. This cost serves as a benchmark in a type of yardstick competition, since it is
used to compute the acceptable profit, computed as the sum of an agreed return on invested
capital plus coverage of variable cost using the benchmark unit cost. The acceptable profit
constitutes an upper bound on the earnings of the firms, since any surplus of actual earnings
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over the acceptable profit will be confiscated by the regulator.
Figure 1 illustrates the mechanism defined by equations (8)-(11) where L(q1, q2) repre-
sents the unregulated profit function. The mechanism follows the Mean Value Theorem in
which there exists a point, q∗(q1, q2), in a closed interval, for example [q1, q2], where the
slope of the tangent line to the cost function, Cˆ(qi), is equal to the slope between the two
points, q1 and q2. This tangent line repræsents the permissible revenue, r(qi; q1, q2), defined
by equation (9) where allowance for fixed cost, I(q1, q2), defined by equation (10) is the
difference between the two lines. Using this mechanism provides at first two points, q1 and
q2, where the two firms make equal profits and second a point, q∗(q1, q2), where the firms
make zero profit and where the profit increases away from this point. The dotted lines, q1
and q2 represent the mechanism defined by equation (11). For quantities lower than q2, the
regulation is non-binding and the firms will be regulated after p(q1 + q2)qi − Cˆ(qi). If the
firms produce between q1 and q2, the regulation is binding and the firms will be regulated
after r(qi; q1, q2) − Cˆ(qi). Finally, for quantities higher than q1, the regulation is again non-
binding and the firms will be regulated after p(q1, q2)qi − Cˆ(qi). If the firms make profit
above the cap, equation (10) is the part of mechanism which secure that the firms refund the
difference between the cap and the exceeding amount.
Fig. 1. Equilibrium under increasing returns to scale
We are interested in equilibria relative to this mechanism, which are pairs (q1, q2) such
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that for each i = 1, 2, qi maximizes the regulated profit defined in (8).
Proposition 2. Let (q1, q2) be an equilibrium with q1 ≥ q2. Then
(i) q1 = max{q′1 | r(q′1; q′1, q2) ≤ p(q′1 + q2)q′1}
(ii) either q2 = min{q′2 | r(q′2; q1, q′2) ≤ p(q1 + q′2)q′2} or q2 maximizes p(q1 + q)q − Cˆ(q),
(iii) q1 > q2.
Proof: (i) Suppose that r(q1; q1, q2) > p(q1 + q2)q1. Then pir1(q1, q2) = p(q1 + q2)q1 and
p(q′1, q2)q
′
1 − Cˆ(q′1) ≤ p(q1, q2)q1 − Cˆ(q1)
for all q′1 in some neighborhood of q1. By the definition of I(q1, q2), we then have that
r1(q1; q1, q2) = Cˆ(q1), so that r(q1; q1+q2)q1 ≤ p(q1+q2)q1, a contradiction, and we conclude
that r(q1; q1, q2) ≤ p(q1 + q2)q1.
Suppose that r(q′1; q1, q2) < p(q
′
1+q2)q
′
1 for some q
′
1 > q1. Now for all q1, q2 with q1 ≥ q2
and q′1 > q1, we have that
r(q2; q′1, q2) − Cˆ(q2) = Iˆ(q′1, q2) + c∗(q′1, q2)q2 − Cˆ(q2)
> Iˆ(q1, q2) + c∗(q1, q2)q2 − Cˆ(q2) = r(q2; q1, q2) − Cˆ(q2)
since Iˆ(q′1, q2) ≥ Iˆ(q1, q2) when q′1 > q1 and c∗(q′1, q2) > c∗(q1, q2), and by our definition of
c∗(q1, q2), we have that
r(q′1; q
′
1, q2) − Cˆ(q′1) = r(q2; q′1, q2) − Cˆ(q2) > r(q2; q1, q2) − Cˆ(q2) = r(q1; q1, q2) − Cˆ(q1),
contradicting that (q1, q2) is an equilibrium. This proves that (i) holds.
(ii) Suppose that q2 does not maximize unrestricted profits p(q1 + q)q − Cˆ(q). Then
r(q2; q1, q2) ≥ p(q1 + q2)q2, and since r(q′2; q1, q2)− Cˆ(q′2) > r(q2; q1, q2)− Cˆ(q2) for q′2 < q2,
we conclude that q2 = min{q′2 | r(q′2; q1, q2) ≤ p(q1 + q′2)q′2}.
(iii) If q1 = q2 = q¯, then using (i) and (ii) we get that r(q; q¯, q) ≤ p(q¯ + q)q only at q¯,
and Cˆ(q¯) = p(2q¯)q which violates our general assumption, so that we may conclude that
q1 > q2.
It may be noticed that the equilibria considered above are not uniquely defined; since it is
not profitable for any of the firms to increase production in an equilibrium, there may indeed
by equilibria which are inferior other equilibria not only from a welfare point of view (total
production is larger in another equilibrium) but also from the point of view of each of the
firms. There is, however, a unique equilibrium (q∗1, q
∗
2) with the properties that q
∗
1 > q
∗
2 and
the total production q∗1 + q
∗
2 is maximal over all equilibria. This particular equilibrium will
be useful for us in the sequel. If we let θ vary in the interval [θ0, θ1], the associated specific
equilibrium defines two functions q∗1(θ), q
∗
2(θ), we we shall make use of in the sequel.
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4. Duopoly with common type and asymmetric information
In the following, we relax the assumption of perfect information and assume that the reg-
ulator cannot observe the type. We retain the assumption that type is a property of the
technology which is available to both firms and therefore the same for both. Also, we retain
the assumption from Section 2 that C(q, θ) is multiplicatively separable,
C(q, θ) = Cˆ(q)θ.
Due to the information asymmetry, each firm may however report a type which differs from
the true one. As in our treatment of the monopoly situation, we shall assume that the reg-
ulatory mechanism is direct in the sense that the firm j sends a message θ j about the type,
after which the mechanism determines the quantity q j(θ1, θ2) to be produced by firm j and
the net income I j(θ1, θ2) to be earned by firm j.
It seems intuitive in this situation to let determine the quantities according to the method
described in the previous subsection, but using the smallest of the two messages θ1, θ2 as the
relevant indicator of type. Define
θ = min{θ1, θ2};
then the mechanism is given by the maps
qˆi(θ1, θ2) = q∗i (θ), i = 1, 2,
together with the rule for determining regulated income,
Iˆi(θ1, θ2) =
I(q
∗
1(θ), q
∗
2(θ)) θi ≤ θ j,
0 θi > θ j.
Thus, the mechanism punishes the firm which sends the highest θ, redistributing income so
that everything goes to the other firm, independently of whether this firm produces the larger
or the smaller amount of the output commodity.
The following is a straightforward consequence of the construction.
Proposition 3. For each type θ ∈ [θ0, θ1], there is an equilibrium of the mechanism (qˆ1, qˆ2, Iˆ)
with truthful revelation such that the firms 1 and 2 produce q∗1(θ), q
∗
2(θ), respectively.
Proof: Suppose that firm j states the true value of the parameter but firm i states θi > θ = θ j.
Then qˆh(θi, θ j) = q∗h(θ) for h = i, j, but Ii(θi, θ j) = 0 ≤ Ii(θ, θ), so stating a higher value is
not advantageous to firm i. If firm i states θi < θ, then qˆi(θi, θ) , q∗i (θ), and since q
∗
i (θ) was
defined is the production which maximizes firm i’s regulated income given the cost function
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θC¯(q), we have that Ii(θi, θ) ≤ Ii(θ.θ), showing that θ is the optimal message for firm i.
The situation considered in this section, where the type is common to both firms but not
observable to the regulator, may not be a very realistic one, and in the following section,
we turn to the more general case where the types, and consequently the cost functions, of
the two firms may differ. The mechanism considered here, which had the sole purpose of
revealing the common type, will not work in that case, and it must be adapted to the new
situation. This will be the done in the following section.
At this point we notice that the mechanism considered in this section still has the feature
of involving no subsidies (or, more generally, involving only subsidies which are indepen-
dent of the level of production) which characterized the duopoly situation of the previous
section. However, in the present situation, the mechanism may produce a revenue to the
regulator, coming from the confiscation of regulated income. This will happen only out of
the truth-telling equilibrium, however, since in the equilibrium no punishment is called for.
5. Extending the mechanism to the case where types may differ
When cost conditions, subsumed into the type parameter θ, may differ among firms, the sim-
ple revelation mechanism of the previous section will have be revised if truthful revelation
is to be maintained. For this purpose, we let the mechanism determine the role of the firms,
so that the firm stating the smaller value of θ will be the one producing the large amount of
output, whereas the firm with high value of the type parameter will be the small producer.
Choosing as before the benchmark value of θ as the smallest of the stated types, the mech-
anism will then determine levels of production q∗1(θ) and q
∗
2(θ) (where the indices now refer
to the selected large and small producers rather than to the original labeling of the firms) as
well as income levels; we shall use the simple rule which assigns Ii(q∗1(θ), q
∗
2(θ) to each of
the firms.
Formally, the mechanism is defined by
i(θ1, θ2) =
argminiθi θi , θ j1 θi = θ j , j(θ1, θ2) =
argmaxiθi θi , θ j2 θi = θ j (12)
q¯i(θ1,θ2)(θ1, θ2) = q
∗
1(min{θ1, θ2}), q¯ j(θ1,θ2)(θ1, θ2) = q∗2(min{θ1, θ2}), (13)
Ii(θ1,θ2) = I1(q
∗
1(min{θ1, θ2})), I j(θ1,θ2) = I2(q∗1(min{θ1, θ2})). (14)
Here the functions i(θ1, θ2) and j(θ1, θ2) selects the large and the small producer given their
stated types, with the convention that firm 1 becomes the large producer when the stated
types are identical. Having selected producers, the choice of production is performed as
previously, taking the smallest of the stated types as the benchmark, and regulated incomes
11
are determined as in Section 3.
While incomes are identical, profits are not, since the small producer with type θ2 has
cost θ2C¯(q∗2(θ)) > θC¯(q
∗
2(θ)). If the difference between θ2 and θ1 is big enough, the small
producer may experience negative profits, so that producing is no longer individually ratio-
nal. To avoid this, we shall restrict attention to cases where the types, though different, are
sufficiently close so that no producer will encounter negative profits. Formally, we state the
assumption as follows.
Assumption 3. The type parameters θ1 and θ2 are selected from a subset D of [θ0, θ1]2 such
that
(θi, θ j) ∈ D⇒ min
h=i, j
Ih(q∗1(min{θi, θ j}), q∗2(min{θi, θ j})) −max{θi, θ j}C¯(q∗2(min{θi, θ j})) ≥ 0.
The assumption says that the net profit of the producer which has the largest value of
the type parameter, and which consequently is set to produce the small amount of output,
remains nonnegative for all admissible parameter values (θ1, θ2). In the interpretation, this
means that the industry-determined uncertainty about productivity is more important than
the individual differences in productivity.
With respect to the information asymmetry we shall retain the assumption that types
are not observable by the regulator, but observable to the firms. This may not be entirely
satisfactory, but it allows us to keep the model simple, allowing for the particular strategy
choices shown below to constitute an equilibrium.
We may now state a version of Proposition 3 which holds for the present version of the
model with moderate type differences among firms.
Proposition 4. Let the set of admissible pairs of type parameter values belong to a set D
satisfying Assumption 3. Then for each (θ1, θ2), the strategy pair (max{θ1, θ2},max{θ1, θ2}) is
an equilibrium of the mechanism (i, j, q¯, I¯) given by (12)-(14).
Proof: Suppose that firm j follows the equilibrium strategymax{θ1, θ2} and let firm i choose
θ′i , max{θ1, θ2}. There are two cases to consider:
(1) θi ≥ θ j. Then j has chosen strategy θi.
If θ′i < θi, then i = i(θ
′
i , θi), so that i becomes the large producer. Consequently, firm i
gets net income
I1(q∗1(θ
′
i )) − θiCˆ(q∗1(θ′1)) < I1(q∗1(θi)) − θ′iCˆ(q∗1(θi)) < I1(q∗1(θi)) − θiCˆ(q∗1(θi)
since the slope of the affine function determining I1(q∗1(θ)) is an increasing function of θ,
q∗1(θ j) < q
∗
1(θ
′
1), and θ
′
i < θ. This shows that the deviation is not advantageous in the case
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i = 1. If i = 2, we notice that
I2(q∗1(θi)) − θiCˆ(q∗2(θi)) = I1(q∗1(θi)) − θiCˆ(q∗1(θi))
so that also in this case the deviation does not result in a higher net profit.
If θ′i > θi, then production and regulated income is unchanged, so net income cannot be
improved in this case.
(2) θi < θ j, so that max{θ1, θ2} = θ j. If θ′i < θ j, then as before we have that
I1(q∗1(θ
′
i )) − θiCˆ(q∗1(θ′1)) < I1(q∗1(θi)) − θiCˆ(q∗1(θi)),
and if θ′i ≥ θ j, then the mechanism chooses the same production and income as with θi. We
conclude that (max{θ1, θ2},max{θ1, θ2}) is indeed an equilibrium.
Although we do not in the present case obtain truthful revelation of preferences, the
equilibrum exhibited achieves something which comes rather close, given the assumption
that types differ only slightly among firms. The intuition behind the result is rather straight-
forward. The mechanism creates competition and gives the regulator the opportunity to use
benchmarking. The benchmark gives the opportunity to compare performances and effi-
ciency across firms. So in a market with asymmetric cost and increasing returns to scale
technology, firms subject to benchmarking cannot credibly understate productivity and per-
form against the expected. And in this market, the regulator will expect the inefficient firm
to produce less than the efficient firm. Following the word of Tangerås (2003), one may say
that “yardstick competition filters out industry-specific productivity and thus reduces firms’
informational advantage”.
The mechanism presented in this paper makes use of this and using the efficient firm as
benchmark secure truthfully cost reports without paying subsidies. This is secured because
the mechanism doesn’t let the inefficient firm influence the variables used in the bench-
mark. This and the use of punisment/loss if a firm misreport its cost secure that the efficient
firm, like the inefficient firm, has no other interest than to report truthfully. This is a essen-
tial feature and the main advantage of our mechanism: It requires minimal information for
truthfully information. The regulator can apply for information and no firm is interested in
misreporting. Another advantage of this mechanism is that it is no vulnerable to collusion,
because the efficient firm wins nothing by a collusion. The firm’s profit is already max-
imised. A collusion can help the inefficient firm if the benchmarking unit cost increases,
but for the efficient firm will higher unit cost, if revenue do not follow, mean lower profit.
Therefore, the efficient firm will not participate in a collusion. In spite of this, our model
has a drawback as the use of competition gives rise to an efficiency lost. The efficiency lost
is the result of having more than one firm in the market. Thus, the regulator can therefore
choose the efficient solution and have the most efficient firm produce paying a subsidy to
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secure truthfully cost reports or the regulator can choose competition and save subsidies, but
have to accept a efficiency lost. Both solutions are costly from a welfare point of view.
6. Concluding comments: Comparing regulated monopoly and duopoly
In the preceding sections, we have discussed very different methods of regulating production
in a market with nondecreasing returns to scale, namely (a) the by now classical method of
truthful revelation by a monopolist, and (b) an alternative approach using regulated compe-
tition between two firms. The presence of nondecreasing returns to scale was important for
the duopoly mechanism; however, it entails a potential welfare loss when there are important
increasing returns to scale, since splitting total production by a single firm into production
in two firms means that the cost of obtaining the same output must increase.
However, in cases where the increasing returns are not very important, this efficiency loss
may turn out to be smaller than the cost of providing the right incentives for a monopolist.
This can be shown by a very simple example with constant returns to scale. Suppose that
the demand in the market is given by
p(q) = 10 − q,
and that we have the simple cost function
C(q, θ) = θ2q.
The parameter θ is assumed to be uniformly distributed in the interval
[
1
2 ,
3
2
]
. Looking specif-
ically at the value θ = 1 we have that classical welfare optimizing production (where price
equals marginal cost) is acheived at q = 8.
In the case of regulated monopoly, consider the case α = 0; then we have that
F(θ)
f (θ)
=
1
2
, zα(1) =
3
2
,
and the production chosen by the mechanism at θ = 1 is q = 7. We have thus a smaller
production reflecting the societal cost of obtaining truthful revelation.
Considering now the duopoly solution (with common parameter determined solely by
industry conditions), we notice that the productions q1 = 7, q2 = 0.5 satisfy the equilibrium
conditions at θ = 1. Indeed, at q1 = 7.5 the cost of production is 15 which is equal to
the revenue to firm 1 given that firm 2 produces q2 = 0.5, namely (9.5 − 7.5) ∗ 7.5 = 15.
And for the small producer, we similarly have that cost at q2 is 1 which equals revenue
(2.5− 0.5) ∗ 0.5 = 1. Due to our special situation of constant returns to scale, the production
plan of firm 2 does not satisfy Proposition 2(ii), but it comes closer to the welfare optimum
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than does the regulated monopoly.
Since the comparison was done for only a single value of the parameter, the result should
not be taken seen as an indication that a duopolistic regulated monopoly is preferable to the
regulated monopoly. Indeed, the welfare loss connected with producing in too small a scale
may very well be more important than the cost of providing incentives to the monopolist.
It should also be noticed that we have in general assumed that the duopolists may charge
the same prices in the equilibrium, which may not be quite satisfactory from the point of
view of applications, although some such cases do occur. An alternative could be the use of
two-part tariffs, which indeed corresponds to the way that regulated income is defined, and
then interpret the revenues as pertaining to the unit prices alone. A more detailed treatment
of the duopoly case with the specific treatment of such features will be the topic of future
research.
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